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Colonialism and Theravada Buddhism 
 It is no secret that the expansion of Western knowledge of Buddhism 
coincided with European imperialism. British colonials were so fascinated by 
the religion they encountered in Burma and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) that they 
undertook projects to interpret and understand Theravada texts. Some British 
scholars with a sympathetic—if not also Orientalist view saw Buddhism as a 
less developed version of Christianity. It was a religion with similar ideals 
and an admirable leader but stunted by a less progressive culture.1 For 
academics interested in other cultures such as Max Weber and Marcel Mauss, 
studying other religions was a way to go back in time and understand 
primitive beliefs that have left few traces in modern European societies. 
Mauss believed that analyzing gift giving in “archaic” societies would show 
the connection to modern societies that revolve around transactions among 
people.2 Weber found in the religions of India, including Theravada 
Buddhism; philosophies that contrasted with a capitalist and “modern” 
model of the Protestant work ethic. However, he also saw Southeast Asian 
cultures as a chance to analyze, explore, and recapture knowledge of a past or 
primitive society.3 Debate about which European scholars have the best and 
most accurate interpretation of Theravada Buddhism continues. 
 Considering the tangling of academic analysis of Theravada Buddhism 
with colonial power, it is not surprising that the Western empire that had the 
most influence in the region would claim to have access to the purest form of 
their religious and philosophical system. Penny Edwards argues that the 
French shaped the discourse on a “true” form of Buddhism and outdid the 
British in defining Buddhism for the West, even though the British project 
started earlier. Although British anthropologists had a hand in translating 
Buddhist scripture, many Theravada monks received their training in French 
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institutions. In order to proliferate the Buddha’s knowledge, the French 
educated Khmer elites and founded schools in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
so that monks and laity alike could learn the language of the scripture (Pali) 
and learn the lessons of the Buddha. The Pali language has long held a 
privileged place in Cambodia and other countries where Theravada 
Buddhism is the dominant religion because it is the language of the most 
important Theravada text: the Tripitaka which includes the Buddha’s dhamma 
and vinaya. Because learning Pali was crucial to the development and 
enrichment of Theravada culture, French schoolmasters believed that the 
Cambodian people had access to teachings on morality and the way to 
salvation thanks to them. The spread of “true” Buddhism, therefore, was a 
French project, which helps explain why the revival of orthodox Theravada 
Buddhist doctrine coincided with French control of Cambodia.4 
 Theravada monks and the French-educated elite contrasted “true” or 
“pure” Theravada doctrine not with the French interpretation of Buddhism 
but with the belief system of the common Cambodian people. This tension 
between monastics and laity persists in Southeast Asia, as some monks 
believe that the uneducated pollute and degrade Theravada Buddhism by 
holding onto incorrect and irrational—not to mention superstitious—
interpretations that turn almsgiving into a form of commodity exchange. 
Monks defending doctrinal views of Theravada Buddhism work to correct 
commoners who believe that almsgiving or providing material support for 
monks will result in an accrual of merit for the donor that will theoretically 
translate into a better future in one’s present life or a more auspicious rebirth. 
Benedicte Brac de la Perriere describes how Burmese monks cast their eyes 
downward when receiving alms in order to avoid giving the impression that 
there is a transactional relationship between monastics and laity.5 One cannot 
earn or transfer merit to another like a commodity through gift giving. 
Richard Gombrich reports that monks in Sri Lanka want to re-educate 
laypeople and dissuade them from linking gifts and commodities. Although 
giving to monks, beggars, and others is a part of the Theravada community, 
monks want to make it clear that deceased ancestors cannot partake in the 
food that laypeople offer.6 
 Max Weber, who has long influenced anthropological studies, suggests 
that Theravada Buddhist doctrine is backwards precisely because it does not 
fit within a capitalist mentality. He argues that monks and the elite of 
Theravada society spread doctrines and principles that are other-worldly and 
irrational because their religious outlook does not fit with an economic model 
of the Protestant work ethic.7 In other words, Weber accepted the “true” and 
orthodox form of Theravada Buddhism promulgated by monks but rejected 
its philosophy all the same as a remnant of a pre-modern and pre-capitalistic 
time. 
 Contemporary anthropologists, working to give voice to the common 
people and show how they have a hand in shaping the Theravada world, have 
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tended away from using doctrine and towards popular practice as a means to 
construct a competing portrait of Southeast Asian communities. Because it is 
still difficult to disentangle colonial powers from the elites of society, there is 
reason to pay more attention to the beliefs of the uneducated and those who 
have fewer material means. Tambiah, who studies Sri Lankan and Thai 
Theravada communities, argues that everyday practices by monks and 
laypeople show that Theravada Buddhism is both rational and oriented 
around economic principles. Although he concedes that Theravada doctrine 
and philosophy privileges other-worldly concerns because it emphasizes 
enlightenment, he believes that the actions of monks and laypeople tell 
another story. Tambiah suggests that Theravada monks engage in activities 
that are grounded in the betterment of this world. For instance, monks work 
to build schools and educate the laity. Through these acts, Tambiah argues 
that Theravada leaders did not simply have a soteriological view, which 
understood salvation as belonging to a different time and place. He further 
suggests that what orthodox monks describe as superstitious gift giving is a 
version of capitalist spending and earning.8 
 Although doctrinaire monks discourage laypeople from thinking that 
they can accrue merit by supporting monks or providing food for the 
deceased, Tambiah believes such gift giving is a means for the laity to develop 
a store of credit to offset any karmic demerits they accumulate simply through 
living. Melford Spiro further suggests that, for Theravada Buddhists living in 
unstable countries such as Burma, spending and giving to earn merit towards 
a future life is a better investment than working to improve one’s present life.9 
French Theorists and Gift Exchange 
 Despite the focus on the practice of Theravada Buddhists, 
anthropologists have not rid themselves of theory. Quite to the contrary, 
philosophers loom large in their analysis of Theravada communities. French 
theorists, in particular, have been influential for anthropologists to 
understand popular practices of Theravada Buddhism. That gift giving is a 
common object of study for contemporary anthropologists can be traced back 
to Marcel Mauss’ research. Mauss declared that gift giving is intrinsic to all 
cultures and epochs10 but he had particular interest in religious gifts. Mauss’ 
research in Hindu texts led him to believe that all giving was reciprocal in 
nature.11 He claimed that, “although the prestations and counter-prestations 
take place under a voluntary guise they are in essence strictly obligatory, and 
their sanction is private or open warfare.”12 Mauss further suggests that 
Hindus understand that it is dangerous to take gifts because they form a bond 
of dependence between the recipient and the donor.13 Scholars disagree if 
Mauss’ claims correctly describe Theravada communities, despite its 
connections to Hindu societies. Michael Walsh reinforces the position of 
Mauss and Spiro, especially as he analyzes the expectations of the laity when 
they give to monks, which is common in Theravada culture. Although 
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laypeople do not give money and alms to monks with the expectation that the 
monks will give the money back with interest, the laity, according to Walsh, 
has a relationship of exchange with the monk. The monk allows the laity to 
earn merit in return for their donations.14 Put simply, the model of mutual 
dependence shows that monks repay the laity for their material support by 
providing them with the merit they need to procure a better future either in 
this life or the next. 
 Jonathan Parry argues, in contrast, that Theravada Buddhism has an 
asymmetrical structure of giving because villagers make offerings to the 
Buddha who has already achieved nirvana and has no need for gifts. Gifts 
only exist in the profane world. Although villagers give alms to monks, the 
laypeople are the ones who are benefitting from the gift. Without monks 
accepting the support, laity would have one fewer source of gaining merit. 
The monks offer their services by accepting alms but do not benefit from them 
because they do not occupy a wholly profane space. The monk receives the 
gift and acts as a field of merit for those who hope to obtain salvation through 
religious donations.15 Parry believes, therefore, that the ritual for accepting 
alms disrupts the notion of a direct relationship of exchange between monk 
and laity. 
 In another interpretation of asymmetrical giving, Claude Levi-Strauss 
builds on Mauss’ work and credits Mauss for being “one of the very first to 
expose the insufficiency of traditional psychology and logic, and to break 
open their rigid frameworks, revealing different forms of thought, seemingly 
‘alien to our adult European mind.’”16 Levi-Strauss takes a position that 
allows him to recognize that monks benefit from almsgiving but laypeople, in 
contrast, may not. He argues that gift giving is based on exchange but an 
indirect one.17 He believes gift giving in Theravada cultures, in particular, 
does not hinge on direct reciprocity. Because there are multiple donors and 
recipients within the system of exchange, there is not an expectation that a 
particular gift will generate a reciprocal gift. There is no guarantee of 
receiving a gift in return. If a gift does arrive, it will likely not be from the one 
whom the original gift was given. In short, there are no reciprocal gifts 
between, say, layperson and monk or donor and recipient. Levi-Strauss 
suggests, instead, that gift giving works in a general economy of exchange.18 
Gift giving is necessary in order to improve the community but there is no 
guarantee of personal return of wealth. Reward comes in the form of a better 
community rather than a more personalized return to the donor. 
 James Laidlaw asserts that anthropologists have, therefore, largely 
followed Mauss’ reading of the gift as a means to strengthen social ties and 
often in terms of obligations between community members. The no-strings 
attached form of gifts does not, according to Mauss and his followers, exist. 
The free gift is, furthermore, of no interest to anthropologists because it does 
not establish social connections.19 Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of gift giving 
reflects nicely the internalization of socio-political knowledge. It is impossible 
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to understand the gift as coming from an isolated individual. The gift 
necessarily exists in relation to the community and the gift reveals the 
multiple forms of capital that work within society.20 The influence of 
Bourdieu’s text, Outline of a Theory of Practice, which shows the circulation and 
transformation of economic capital into other forms of capital, still influences 
anthropologists. Richard Gombrich, for instance, believes that merit-making 
by supporting a monk financially allows individuals to be seen as spiritually 
virtuous.21 In this way, economic capital turns into social capital in Theravada 
communities because the donor uses gifts to monks to gain esteem and 
recognition as a virtuous person in the community. 
 Katherine Bowie, who works to understand the agency of those in lower 
classes to push back against capitalism, also uses Bourdieu’s framework to 
reveal social connections and obligations. She suggests that beggars use gift 
giving to wield power over would-be donors. In Theravada Thai 
communities,22 beggars supply those with means with another field of merit. 
Bowie emphasizes the parallel between the treatment of monks and beggars 
while receiving material support. In both cases, donors remove their shoes 
and raise a bowl of rice over their head before offering it to the other. The poor 
provide an opportunity to give and part with material possessions for the 
good of the community. Conversely, Bowie reports that the underclass of Thai 
society has threatened to destroy property and goods of the wealthier 
community members if they continuously deny rice or other material support 
to beggars when they arrive.23 This socio-political framework casts doubt on 
whether gift giving is a result of solidarity with the other. Because Bourdieu 
uses the master concept of interest to understand gift giving and human 
actions in general, he does not leave room for solidarity with the other. Do 
donors give out of self-interestedness or out of compassion with the other? A 
gift in this context, in other words, points to the paradox of the gift. Presenting 
a disinterested gift seems to be an impossible act.24 
Disrupting the Gift Economy 
 Derrida’s analysis of the gift is similar to that of Bourdieu because he 
recognizes the asymmetrical form that is inherent within gift giving. Despite 
Derrida’s numerous texts on the gift, Theravada scholars do not make much 
use of Derrida’s theories to understand gift giving in Southeast Asian 
Buddhist communities because he focuses on the philosophical contradiction 
within gift giving. On the one hand, engaging with Derrida’s concept of the 
gift goes against the dominant socio-political reading of gift giving in 
Theravada culture. On the other, there is something to be gained. Because 
Derrida works to understand gifts outside the socio-political structure that 
mimics the circulation of money, he is more able than Bourdieu and others 
mentioned above to think gift giving as a gesture of solidarity with the other. 
 By pushing asymmetry to its limit, Derrida breaks with dominant 
anthropological readings of the gift. Derrida believes a true gift is given when 
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there is no possibility of return. The gift, according to Derrida, must be given 
without an intent or desire for any type of recompense. He analyzes “the gift 
that is not a present, the gift of something that remains inaccessible, 
unpresentable, and as a consequence secret.”25 The donor must not expect 
repayment, a reciprocal gift, or even a show of gratitude. Giving, when placed 
in a circular economy of reciprocity, reveals a pernicious connection to debt. 
If giving engenders a gift in return, the recipient is indebted to the donor. The 
gift, therefore, is not a gift. The unconditional gift calls, instead, for a 
forgetting of the self. An unidentifiable donor circumvents the need to repay 
or thank a particular person. As David Borman notes, disinterested charity 
spurns the recognition of others but this can also be dangerous if this is a 
means for the giver to solidify notions of superiority. The only safeguard 
against such egocentrism requires forgetting that one has given.26 A true gift, 
then, points to an absurdity where the gift giver is a secret kept even from the 
giver. 
 In the Gift of Death, Derrida engages the reading of Abraham made 
famous by Kierkegaard to reinforce the importance of paradox and secrecy. 
For Kierkegaard, Abraham breaks with ethics through his willingness to 
answer God’s call to sacrifice Isaac. Because ethics operates as a guideline for 
all community members to follow and Abraham’s actions are hardly a model 
for the many, Kierkegaard proclaims that Abraham does not act ethically. 
Instead, Abraham exemplifies the singularity that marks his relationship with 
God. Only in this context, does it make sense that Abraham is a hero in the 
Christian world.27 
 A Derridean reading further suggests that the relationship between 
Abraham and God hinges on a secret that cannot be shared with or mimicked 
by the community. He adds, “It is only a matter of his determination, his 
passive-and-active commitment not-to-be-able-to-mean-to-say, to keep a 
secret even under the worst conditions, hence unconditionally…That is the 
test of unconditionality in love, namely the oath sworn between two absolute 
singularities.”28 The proximity of love and the monstrous are bridged by the 
mysterious relationship to the other. Abraham in preparing his unconditional 
gift of Isaac to God says nothing to others about his plans. He bears the 
monstrousness of God’s call and keeps it hidden from Sarah and Isaac. The 
unconditional gift is an example of a secret that cannot be said, in part, 
because it defies understanding. The call of God is wholly other and, 
therefore, monstrous. Unlike Kierkegaard, Derrida argues that the 
relationship to the other, which is incomprehensible and even abhorrent to 
the community, is what allows for ethics. At the same time, the openness that 
Abraham exhibits towards God shows his unconditional love for God. 
Indeed, Rodolphe Gasche highlights the role of love within Derrida’s 
mystery. “[T]he unseen gaze of an absolutely self-less Goodness … shakes the 
soul (self or person) because it is unable to adequately respond to this gift of 
love.”29 Abraham’s responsibility to God stems from God singling him out, 
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which alludes to the gift of being that God has bestowed to Abraham. 
Although Abraham never catches a glimpse of God, he cannot deny the 
goodness of his existence that God has made possible. Abraham’s willingness 
to accept responsibility for the murderous act out of love for God, 
furthermore, is a form of solidarity with the other that falls outside of the 
socio-economic understanding of the gift. 
 That Derrida conjures up Abraham’s relationship with God as a focal 
point in his analysis of the gift may be off-putting to those who study 
Theravada Buddhism, where there is no personal savior. Derrida suggests, 
also in contrast to anthropological readings, that the gift shows a connection 
between two singular beings that falls outside of the community. A gift can 
have meaning precisely because it does not cohere with social norms and 
dictates. Derrida reinforces the ethics of gift giving through his reading of 
Mauss. He argues that, Mauss’ analysis highlights an ethics of generosity that 
the giving-being embodies. The gift, furthermore, reveals excess and that 
which the community cannot capture even in language. Mauss, in Derrida’s 
view, enumerates a dizzying array of gifts from potlatch to marriage (giving 
away one’s child) so as to point to a madness that cannot be bound by a 
transactional system or language itself.30 Mauss, Derrida relays, “has gone too 
quickly and too superficially over questions that deserve a wider 
treatment…”31 In the end, Mauss’ cataloguing of gifts makes the gift 
incomprehensible. How are these forms of exchanges related to gifts? It is 
unclear. Is there a thread that connects these examples of gifts? Again, it is 
unclear. 
 Considering Derrida’s treatment of the gift, it is not surprising that 
anthropologists would shy away from his work that leads to puzzlement 
rather than greater understanding. Anthropologists, moreover, may resist 
Derrida’s treatment of the gift because he shrouds the gift in mysteries that 
frustrate—rather than reveal—knowledge about the workings of a 
community. Prominent anthropologists such as Tambiah have, indeed, 
fought to establish a this-worldly philosophy of Theravada Buddhism. 
Anthropologists, who are sympathetic to Bourdieu, privilege readings of 
almsgiving and gift giving that connect meaning making within the earthly 
community and particularly in terms of power structures in society. Taking 
up Derrida’s reading of the gift would seem to erase these efforts when he 
discusses singular relationships that not only make no sense for the 
community as a whole but also points to a connection with an other-worldly 
being. 
Gifts and Ghosts  
 Rosalind Morris suggests that Derrida’s disavowal of anthropology’s 
humanist methodology has not, however, blunted his influence on the field.32 
Many anthropologists, to the contrary, have found Derrida useful for 
understanding annual festivals in Southeast Asia that center on giving to 
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hungry ghosts.33 Although anthropologists explicitly engage with Derrida’s 
hauntological theories when it concerns ghost festivals, I suggest that his 
analysis of hauntology reinforces and deepens his concept of the gift—which 
anthropologists do not favor. Derrida’s analysis of gift giving in conjunction 
with his philosophy of hauntology allows for a space of giving that challenges 
the strict dichotomy between this world and another world and dualistic 
thinking, generally, that runs through Western ontology. The link to the other-
worldly, the monstrous, and the irrational or other to capitalist logic are all 
elements that connect Derrida’s gift and hauntology to Southeast Asian ghost 
festivals. The gift connects to the ghost, as its being and presence are in 
question. Derrida states, “the gift, if there is any, should overrun the border, 
to be sure, toward the measureless and the excessive; but it should also 
suspend its relation to the border and even its transgressive relation to the 
separable line or trait of the border.”34 From a hauntological perspective, the 
reach of gifts beyond the earthly realm blurs the line between the world of 
material goods and spirit world. The gift, like the ghost in Derrida’s work, 
defies containment. Gifts and ghosts, furthermore, point to the ambiguity of 
rational, economic, national boundaries. Giving to ghosts neither reinforces 
nor completely annuls borders of logic. 
 Ghost festivals disrupt the notion that Theravada Buddhism must 
orient its philosophy either towards the dictates of this world or succumb to 
the mysticism of another world. There is a common belief in Southeast Asia 
that it is possible for the deceased to exist in a space between life and death 
for various reasons. Anyone who had not lived a meritorious life or anyone 
who had not been given the proper funerary rites may not be able to break 
fully from the world of the living. Because war and conflict have left their 
mark on this region of Asia, there are many who committed immoral acts or 
have died in ways that have made it impossible for their family to hold a 
traditional burial ceremony. That is to say, many believe that ghosts haunt 
Southeast Asia in the form of monstrous beings who have been deformed 
because they cannot receive the nourishment they need to move beyond the 
ghostly realm. Yet the people, nevertheless, should try to feed and support 
these hideous beings. 
 These annual rituals to feed hungry ghosts allow Southeast Asians to 
provide acts of kindness and develop bonds with those who fall outside set 
familial, geopolitical, national, and temporal boundaries. As Derrida explains, 
hauntology “gives place and gives rise [donne lieu]. All national rootedness, 
for example, is rooted first of all in the memory or the anxiety of a displaced-
or displaceable-population.”35 Participants of the festival are able to mourn 
the loss of those close to them, those who were cast as enemies, and even those 
lost souls who no one remembers by name. Ghost festivals in post-colonial 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are distinctive because they aim to feed and 
care for beings even if they do not share one’s political affiliation, bloodline, 
or even humanity. Honoring and feeding the dead through these annual 
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celebrations are an attempt to ease the suffering of ghosts and give them what 
they need to transition into another, more auspicious form of existence. In 
short, the role of the gift is integral for understanding ghost festivals. 
 In Laos, villagers often fill baskets with the favorite foods of their dead 
relatives. Some even affix particular names of relatives to the baskets of foods 
and goods. Patrice Ladwig reports, though, that there is debate over whether 
or not ghosts can benefit from the gifts given by villagers. More doctrinaire 
monks argue that the gifts are really meant for them. This is the reason why 
wealthier community members now purchase pre-packaged gift baskets with 
objects that are most useful to monks to donate during the festival. Hence, 
there is synchronicity and melding between doctrinal Theravada and colonial 
readings of irrational attendants of ghost festivals. A scholar in the mold of 
Weber would likely see the ghost festival as an indicator of a pre-modern 
religion replete with irrational acts. Some orthodox Theravada monks, in 
similar fashion, describe feeding ghosts as superstitions that have been held 
over by a past and impure understanding of Buddhism. For anthropologists 
following in the tradition of Weber and scholarly monastics, capitalism and 
rationality work together. Those who do not prescribe to capitalist gift giving 
are, therefore, illogical because they believe that there is no strict line between 
this world and the other world. Yet villagers often place things such as combs 
in baskets, which would not be of any use to monks who all shave their heads. 
This suggests that some people believe that the deceased will make use of the 
gifts and that there can be some crossover between the material and spiritual 
worlds.36 
 Ladwig argues, furthermore, that ghosts operate as a form of political 
resistance for ethnic Lao. Because the state would rather be rid of monastic 
powers that challenge government, ghosts can represent a means for the 
people to express their desire to recapture or reassert their belief in a 
Buddhism that the state has repressed. Belief in ghosts goes hand-in-hand, 
therefore, with a challenge to the state. Monks are central to ghost celebrations 
because the festivals often occur on Buddhist temple grounds. The state, 
therefore, sees the celebration of ghost festivals as a reclaiming of past 
Buddhist traditions and places Buddhism in the millenarian struggle for a 
more just future for the people.37 Heonik Kwon treats ghosts—like the monks 
in Laos—as beings that have the power to shape and disrupt the world of the 
living if they do not receive the proper care and respect. Unlike Western 
therapists who interpret ghosts as a response to a psychological trauma, a 
hauntological reading of ghosts suggests that they can have a kind of material 
existence. In a reading of post-war Vietnam, Kwon stresses that community 
members and informants believe that ghosts have the ability to cause damage 
in the physical world and even kill the living. 
 They are forced to move in the periphery of this world and live in the 
fringes of the other. Kwon states, “In short, ghosts are ontological refugees 
who are uprooted from home, which is a place where their memory can be 
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settled.”38 They are ontological refugees because they are not at home either 
in the world of the dead or the living. The trauma of the Pol Pot regime, which 
was coextensive with the Vietnam War, has added an extra layer of danger in 
the way ghosts are conceptualized in Cambodia. If relatives or friends died 
during the Khmer Rouge, they may be enraged. Cambodians believe that 
ghosts enjoy tormenting and can kill the living in order to have a companion.39 
Ghosts can drag the living into their world, which shows that the ontological 
status of the living is not stable either. 
Hauntology and the Present 
 Hauntology reflects the ontological status of the living as well as ghosts. 
Although Derrida does not engage with Buddhist ontology, his ideas 
concerning hauntology resonate with the Theravada conception of the self. 
The Theravadin understanding of “no-self” and the ghost hinge on dynamism 
and the coming together of composite parts that shift.40 Much has been written 
about the five aggregates that constitute the no-self (body, mind, volition, 
sense, and perception) but the element of time, which is not counted as an 
aggregate, is often hidden. A hauntological perspective fits with the concept 
of no-self because Derrida describes being and co-dependent arising. Derrida 
states:  
Now… what properly (eignet) belongs to a present, be it to 
the present of the other, to the present as the other, is the 
jointure of its lingering awhile, of its time, of its moment 
(die Fuge seiner Weile). What the one does not have, what 
the one therefore does not have to give away, but what the 
one gives to the other, over and above the market, above 
market, bargaining, thanking, commerce, and commodity, 
is to leave to the other this accord with himself that is 
proper to him (ihm eignet) and gives him presence.41 
Breaking from the canonical Western notion that the self exists as a 
contained and atomized being, Derrida suggests that one needs the other and 
to give to the other in order to understand oneself, which adds a relational 
aspect to Heidegger’s intentionally abstract ontology. Some one has to give 
some thing to another.42 What one has, can, or is willing to offer to the other 
elucidates what belongs and constitutes the self because one cannot offer what 
one does not have. While Derrida moves towards grounding being through 
the gift—to which presence is tethered, the other remains difficult to define 
and allusive. Derrida’s hauntology, therefore, does not operate strictly on the 
plane of abstract ontology nor does he seek to find meaning solely through 
material interactions. 
 Jean Langford suggests that, “The dead might be conceptualized, 
ultimately, not only as versions, but also as temporary, if recurring, 
coalescences, shifting assemblages similar to the Buddhist self, playing loose 
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with time.”43 On a rudimentary level, it is clear that one’s physical body and 
ideas do not remain consistent through time. It is also the case that certain 
parts of the self can remain largely the same while others change. For instance, 
one remains the same height for years while one may have various beliefs 
about religion throughout one’s life. The no-self changes in physical form and 
shifts in time. Time serves as the backdrop for the coalescing and disbanding 
of aggregate parts. Time is the invisible but allows for appearance.44 
 Ghosts are not only ambiguous in terms of being and substance but they 
also raise questions concerning time that go beyond ascertaining historical 
eras in relations to colonialism, which are common tools for understanding 
the significance of ghost festivals in Southeast Asia. Anthropologists show 
that believing in ghosts or participating in ghost festivals shows one’s political 
allegiance. In Cambodia, the festival to feed ghosts (pchum ben in Khmer) is 
not seen by “modernists” as properly belonging to Buddhism. Traditionalists, 
conversely, see it as integral to Khmer culture because it has connections to 
Ang Duang, the last king before a French colonial protectorate was 
established in 1863. This is not a historically accurate claim but rather alludes 
to a political statement by the Khmer people.45 Holt stresses the ways that the 
importance of this festival serves as a resistance to both Communist and 
French influence. Even young Khmer monks recognize that pchum ben is 
more a Khmer tradition than a Buddhist festival. This is striking to Holt for 
two reasons. First, monks continue to inflect the ritual with Buddhism and 
bind the two together. Hinton et al also suggests that Cambodians invoke the 
qualities of the Buddha during festivals in order to ward off ghostly harm.46 
Second, the realization that this ritual is not Buddhist was probably not clear 
to Cambodians until the arrival of the French. Beforehand, there was no 
questioning that what belonged to Khmer culture was Buddhist.47 
 Derrida invites us through hauntology to play with notions of time and 
to recognize what is present and what is not present, which includes both the 
past and the future. Ghosts in Southeast Asia conjure up the hauntological 
because they do not exist properly as spirits or earthbound beings, as Kwon 
describes, and because it conjures up the often hidden connection between 
being and time that arises from a philosophical analysis that is often missing 
from ghost festivals. These festivals reveal the ways that the present, the past, 
and the future converge in the treatment of ghosts. Derrida’s analysis of gifts 
and exchange point to the being-together and at-the-same-time.48 It is, indeed, 
difficult to discern which meanings of ghost festivals belong to the Khmer 
tradition and that which is a response to outside forces. They comingle, even 
as scholars try to separate them. 
 Although Derrida—who identifies as Franco-Maghrebian49—reflects on 
France’s relationship with its past North African colonies in his work 
concerning the other, he mentions nothing about France’s influence in 
Southeast Asia. This is curious because as Harootunian notes, 
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‘Southeast Asia’ has always been the common frame that 
structured the particular relationship between Europe of 
the colonizers and its Asian colonized and thus became the 
location that best exemplified for him the peculiar nature of 
the “haunting,” as he puts it, as both the place of 
comparison and the necessity of comparability… As a 
result, Southeast Asia, and by extension all colonies, 
became the overdetermined place of haunting.50 
By confronting the ghost of colonialism in Southeast Asia, Western 
philosophers can see that time has been crucial for lending a positive air to 
Theravada Buddhism that takes into account the other-worldly. Although 
earlier colonial forays required a this-worldly defense of Theravada cultures, 
time has now made it possible to see that Theravada communities may have 
a lesson to give to Western others precisely because its relationship to the 
other (world) is ambiguous. 
Conclusion 
 Because knowledge about Theravada ghost festivals depends on 
anthropological fieldwork, analyses of social and power networks are front 
and center. The desire to interpret ghost festivals as practitioners, rather than 
foreigners, would is understandable given the history of colonialism in 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Yet the emphasis in Bourdieu’s 
anthropological research, for instance, has been to understand gift giving in 
terms of gaining power and status, which has made locating ethical currents 
in Theravada communities difficult. As the work of Kwon and Ladwig shows, 
some Theravada Buddhists maintain that giving to ghosts is an act of kindness 
and solidarity with the other. In Laos, monks residing on temple grounds not 
only help organize the annual event but they also represent the ethical 
responsibility to care for the other. Monks, like the hungry ghosts of the 
festivals, require the support of the people for food.51 In Sri Lanka, it is custom 
to carry small coins to give to a beggar as a show of compassion.52 
Obeyesekere further notes also that Theravada Buddhists believe that 
rejoicing in the good work of another is valuable because that act of 
recognizing meritorious behavior creates merit for the one who rejoices even 
if she has not made an offering herself.53 Ignoring the ethical sentiments of 
local practitioners or reworking these acts to fit into a transactional and 
capitalist schema does not capture the complexity of gifts and ghosts in 
Theravada culture. 
 It is not clear how much Theravada practices have shifted with the rise 
of capitalism in Southeast Asia but it is also possible that interpretations of 
the irrational villager can be transformed into one who resists capitalist 
tendencies. Invoking Derrida’s hauntology allows a greater possibility for  the 
ontological and the ethical to mix with socio-political readings of Theravada 
communities. Only by addressing the other, which can include the other-
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worldly or that which does not completely belong to this world, can there be 
a glimpse of the ethical. Whereas Tambiah fought against an other-worldly 
interpretation of Theravada Buddhism in order to show that its philosophy 
was rational and in sync with capitalism, a hauntological examination of 
Theravada practices such as giving to ghosts shows that contact with the other 
(in terms of theory or another discipline such as philosophy) can be positive. 
Philosophers may be freer than anthropologists to take lessons from others 
because they do not feel obliged to represent fully and accurately what the 
other means. Derrida, in particular, plays with meaning, what others mean to 
say, and what is said nevertheless. In this spirit, ghost festivals are an 
opportunity for thinking an ethics of the gift. Ghost festivals, indeed, show 
the tension in accepting the ethical component of the celebration, which some 
participants want to maintain, while not falling into an Orientalizing reading 
of ghost festivals as a romanticized resistance to Western capitalism. 
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